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Nontechnical summary
This study provides a comprehensive descriptive analysis of labor market transitions
and wage mobility in the German labor market based on a large administrative data
set, the IAB employment subsample 75–97. The analysis is motivated by equilibrium
search theory, which predicts a close relationship between labor market frictions and
the wage distribution in a cross section of workers. The friction parameters govern job
separations (job destruction rate) and job accessions (job offer rate), thus determining
the residual wage dispersion for a set of workers with comparable attributes. The basic
argument is the existence of imperfect information (”slow” job accession) on the one
hand and economic turbulence (job destruction) on the other hand.
As the first step of our analysis, we provide a detailed analysis of job destructions,
job accessions, job-to-job transitions, and all other labor market transitions, which
are identifiable in our data set. We focus on the differences across individuals with
different characteristics as well as on the cyclical behavior of transition rates. The
latter reveals information on cleansing and sullying effects of the business cycle. The
time series properties of both stocks and transition rates are considered. The data show
marked differences across different groups of individuals. Some of these differences are
consistent with search theory and other labor market theories. For example, the data
confirm that individuals often change jobs when they are young and when they earn
lower wages. It is also found that individuals with low formal educational level are
most likely to become benefit recipients and that they are least likely to be employed
in two consecutive periods. Regarding cyclical features, we find that the job-to-job
transition rate is clearly procyclical, while the rate of transitions from job to benefit
recipiency is clearly countercyclical.
Human capital theory predicts a central role for the acquisition of human capital on
the job for wage growth, while search theory predicts a central role of job mobility for
wage growth during the course of an individual’s career. As the second step of our
analysis, we examine direct job-to-job transitions and associated wage changes, We
control for the position in the wage distribution and other characteristics. We find
that most individuals (almost two thirds) gain from job mobility, earning on average
about 25% more after the transition. This is well in accordance with a search-theoretic
approach. But, it has to be recognized, that a considerable amount of individuals
lose from job-to-job transitions and they lose a considerable amount (15% on average),
which is hardly explicable by a simple search–theoretic model. We also find that
low wage earners gain more often from job mobility and that their average gains are
higher (as a percentage of their previous earnings). Regarding job mobility involving an
intervening unemployment spell, we find that a longer unemployment spell is associated
with slightly lower chances to improve upon the previous wage, while the average gain
of those who improve increases.
Finally, we analyze the determinants of improvements of the relative position in the
wage distribution. We consider all individuals employed in two consecutive years and
we classify them according to the wage decile in both years. Estimating an Ordered
Probit, we analyze the determinants of upward or downward mobility in the wage
distribution. We find that job-to-job transitions play a crucial role for wage mobility
and that the propensity to move up the wage ladder is higher for younger compared
to older individuals. Summarizing, our analysis supports the view that wages and
transitions are closely related and that job mobility is a central determinant of wage
growth.
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changes. Accordingly, job–to–job transitions are central in explaining the wage dis-
tribution. This paper uses the IAB employment subsample to describe the empirics
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1 Introduction
For a long time the literature in economics has concentrated on a static perspective
of the labor market. Since Stigler’s seminal paper (1961) on the effect of imperfect
information in markets, a huge literature on price dispersion for identical products
and the decision problems for either side of the market has developed. By nature, the
process of acquiring information is time-consuming and therefore dynamic. We conduct
an empirical analysis on labor market dynamics and wages based on this theoretical
background, which is now seen as ”the canonical framework for the analysis of labor
markets” (Moscarini (2003)). This paper intends to give a comprehensive empirical
overview on wages and employment dynamics in the labor market without a priori
restrictions on the data. We investigate differences in transition rates and in the wage
structure over time and across individuals with specific characteristics. Our results
cannot be used to discriminate between competing theories of the labor market in a
strict sense. Nevertheless, in a number of cases the results allow to assess whether
theoretical predictions are consistent with the data.
The motivation for this paper and, especially, for considering labor market transitions
and wages together builds on equilibrium search theory (see Mortensen (2003) for an
overview). In their seminal work on equilibrium wage dispersion for homogeneous work-
ers Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that the amount of frictions determines the
extent of wage dispersion for homogeneous workers in a labor market. Frictions them-
selves can be measured by labor market transitions. To see this, recognize that frictions
persist because there is imperfect information in the labor market. Individuals do not
know their outside wages and have to acquire this information in a time-consuming
process. Once they have acquired the information, they process it and take the op-
timal decision based on a standard optimization problem. This implies, for instance,
that individuals climb the wage ladder slowly, and that wage differentials diminish over
time. Since jobs do not last forever, but also end for reasons beyond the control of
firms and workers, the process does not converge to a single wage, and an equilibrium
cross-sectional wage distribution exists.1 This argument identifies two important fric-
tion parameters in search theory: the job offer rate and the job destruction rate. The
first can be viewed as reflecting informational frictions, being the result of the process
of acquiring information. The second parameter represents the amount of turbulence
and shocks in the economy (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). Because of the
importance of frictions for the wage distribution, we scrutinize the changes in these
friction parameters over time and across demographic groups.
Human capital theory assumes that the wage growth of individuals over time is mainly
caused by the acquisition of human capital while working in a given job. Search theory
suggests that the main source of wage growth over the course of an individual’s career
1Note, that the above argument also implies that the distribution of wages in a cross section of
workers is not the same as the distribution of wages in a cross section of newly created jobs.
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is the wage growth caused by (voluntary) job–to–job transitions. This leads us to
examine the wage growth associated with job–to–job transitions. Since it might be
the wage-tenure profile instead of the level of wages which influences the decision to
change the job, we also investigate the wage growth of job movers and stayers (see
e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b), Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004)).
Finally, we take a closer look at the determinants of changing the relative position
in the wage distribution to analyze the factors determining the relative success in the
labor market and the importance of job–to–job transitions in this respect.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 states the results of search theory, that
motivate our analysis. Section 3 describes the data set used. In section 4, we state
some facts about stocks and rates, their differences across groups, and their cyclical
behavior. Afterwards, we investigate in some detail the job–to–job transitions and their
impact on wages for different groups. Finally, we estimate determinants of changes in
the relative position of the wage distribution. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Stigler’s (1961) seminal contribution to the literature started a lively debate on the
effects of informational imperfections. The literature on informational frictions con-
centrated first on the search problem of individuals when confronted with different
prices for a homogeneous product. It was shown that under certain circumstances the
search problem can be interpreted as an optimal stopping problem, where the solution
is characterized by a reservation wage/price. The other side of the market was rarely
analyzed in detail, i.e. it remained unclear why price/wage dispersion arises. The
matching literature (see e.g. Pissarides (2000), who is a major proponent of this liter-
ature) suffers strongly from this shortcoming. On the one hand, the motivation for the
existence of an informational imperfection is argued to come from heterogenous prices
for homogeneous products. On the other hand, in this literature, there is generally just
one price in equilibrium, so that it is difficult to argue why informational imperfections
exist. Therefore, we shift our focus from the matching literature to the equilibrium
search literature.
Stigler’s contribution already shows that the amount of information imperfection is
somehow related to the degree of price dispersion for a homogeneous product in the
market. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) formalize the idea in the context of labor
markets. They resolve the Diamond-Paradoxon (1971), which states that under a
Poisson-assumption for job offers and wage setting by firms, a non-degenerate price
dispersion for homogeneous workers cannot be an equilibrium.2 Under Diamond’s
assumptions, firms have the whole bargaining power over the rent resulting from the
2A theoretical paper by Albrecht and Axell (1984) that implies an equilibrium wage distribution
with two mass points was an earlier attempt to resolve this paradox.
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market imperfection. Therefore, identical workers with identical reservation wages are
offered the same wage by firms, their reservation wage. The crucial difference in the
paper by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is that workers are allowed to search on–
the–job for a better–paying job. This guarantees that the Burdett and Judd (1983)
condition for equilibrium price dispersion is met, i.e. that one part of the individuals
(here: the employed) is able to compare wages. This yields a trade-off in firms’ wage
policy, since a higher wage attracts more workers and causes the firms to lose fewer
workers to competitors. This essential point of the model guarantees the existence of
a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution among identical individuals and firms.
In equilibrium, high-wage firms have high employment, and make small profits per
employee, whereas low-wage firms have low employment and make high profits per
employee.
The amount of wage dispersion we observe in this model is directly linked to the pos-
sibility of individuals changing jobs. The more often they change jobs, the faster they
climb the wage ladder towards their marginal productivity. Hence, the market im-
perfection is weaker and the wage dispersion is smaller. If jobs never ended, except
through job–to–job transitions, unemployment would converge to zero and the wage
dispersion to the marginal productivity of the individuals. So, the second determinant
(and a necessary condition) for wage dispersion is the frequency at which jobs end for
reasons not related to the individuals decision to change a job (called ,,job destruc-
tion”). If they end more often, equilibrium unemployment and therefore the inflows
into low-wage firms will rise. Accordingly, the frequency of exogenous job destruction
acts to increase wage dispersion.3 More formally: consider the model as outlined by
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Let λL denote the rate at which employees receive of-
fers from competing firms (job offer rate). Further, let δ denote the rate at which jobs
end for exogenous reasons. y denotes the marginal productivity and wR the reservation
wage of the individuals. Then the resulting equilibrium wage offer distribution is4
(1) H(w) =

0 for w < wR
λL+δ
λL
(
1−
√
y−w
y−wR
)
for wR ≤ w < wo
1 for w ≥ wo
Hence, the wage distribution is determined by the two frictional parameters λL and
δ, the marginal productivity and the reservation wage. However, what is observed in
the data is not the wage offer distribution but the distribution of paid wages. The
distribution of paid wages is determined by the same parameters, and the link between
the two distributions can be derived, assuming equilibrium, as (see Garloff (2003))
(2) G(w) =
δH(w)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ) .
3Both statements are only correct under some parameter restrictions. For a more precise treatment,
see Fitzenberger and Garloff (2005).
4A derivation of this formula can be found in Garloff (2003).
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For this distribution we can directly calculate the variance as a wage dispersion mea-
sure. It is given by (see Van den Berg and Ridder (1993), p.48ff.)
(3) varG(w) = 1/3(y − wmin)2η(1− η)2,
where η = δ
δ+λL
is a frictions indicator often used in the search literature, and wmin
is a minimum wage. This shows more formally our motivation to deal with labor
market dynamics and therefore with the transition rates when thinking about wages.
The above formulas show that informational frictions are an important determinant of
wages.
There are two major objections against this model. First, the resulting wage distribu-
tion is skewed to the left. This is at odds with observed wage distributions which are
typically skewed to the right. Even after a segmentation of the labor market in (more or
less) homogeneous segments, e.g. in age-education cells as in Fitzenberger and Garloff
(2005), or in age-education-profession-industry cells as in Van den Berg and Ridder
(1998), (German) wages are not skewed to the left.5 Second, a more important draw-
back is that the model is built for homogeneous individuals and firms. It is difficult
to argue that, even after a market segmentation, individuals are homogeneous or at
least not distinguishable from the point of view of the firm (see e.g. Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999), who find a strong individual component in the determinants of
wages).
In reaction to these objections, several extensions have been discussed including exoge-
nous or endogenous heterogeneity on the side of the firms (see e.g. Bontemps, Robin,
and Van den Berg (2000), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)), exogenous or endogenous
heterogeneity on the side of the workers (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Moen
(1999)) or exogenous heterogeneity on both sides of the market (see e.g. Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002b), Teulings and Gautier (2004)). However, all these models have in
common that wages are determined partly by search frictions. So the principal insight
remains: there is a close connection between labor market dynamics and the wage
distribution along the arguments of search theory, which we will assess in more detail
later.
Let us summarize our theoretical section by stating empirical implications of search
theory.
• There is a close connection between wages and labor market frictions. Labor
market frictions in the sense of this paper are informational imperfections and,
basically, constitute barriers to mobility. They cause economically motivated
labor market transitions not to take place immediately. Labor market transition
rates can be seen as an indicator of labor market frictions.
5On the contrary, Gautier and Teulings (2003) conclude in their application for six OECD countries,
including Germany, that the theoretical prediction of a left skewed wage distribution is in accordance
with the data.
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• Transitions between unemployment and employment depend on the job offer
rate when unemployed, job–to–job transitions depend on the job offer rate when
employed. Both rates depend both on macroeconomic conditions (e.g. labor
market tightness) and on individual behavior (e.g. search intensity).
• Transitions from employment to unemployment depend on the exogenous job
destruction rate and therefore on the business cycle.
• The job–to–job transition rate depends on the wage earned in the current job
since the probability that an i.i.d. offer from the wage offer distribution exceeds
the earned wage declines with wage. By the same argument, the job–to–job
transition rate also depends on age, since individuals climb the wage ladder as
time progresses.6
• Generally speaking, the simple equilibrium search model does not make any pre-
dictions how the different rates vary with education, sex, nationality, marital
status, professional status or sector. However, in the context of this theoretical
framework, we can give most differences a meaningful interpretation.
• Job–to–job transitions are the crucial determinant of wage growth in an indi-
vidual’s career. From the point of view of the simple equilibrium search model
presented above, they occur exclusively because of wage gains.
• Average wage gains through job–to–job transitions decrease with the earned wage
and with age, since older individuals earn more on average.
• The share of job–to–job transitions involving wage gains decreases with age, since
the number of job–to–job transitions that are economically motivated in the sense
discussed above decreases, holding other noneconomic reasons that cause job–to–
job transitions constant.
3 Data and Definitions
The empirical analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large
administrative data set for Germany for the time period 1975 to 1997, see Bender,
Haas, and Kloose (2000). The IABS contains information from two sources. The first
source is the employment statistic based on the integrated notification procedure for
health insurance, social security, and unemployment insurance. This way, employers
are required to report employment under the social security system which covers about
80% of all employees. Civil servants, self-employed, helping family, students, and
employees earning less than a certain low threshold income are not covered by the
system. The second source for the IABS are the transfer payments to the unemployed.
6This is true only if λL > δ. In our data set this condition is met (see table 3 in the appendix).
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The two sources are merged together for a one percent random sample of employees
from the social security records. Therefore, by construction, the data set is represen-
tative regarding employment covered by the social security system but not regarding
unemployment. The information on timing (daily!) of being in one labor market state
(spells) and on the gross daily wage (rounded to DM) are exact, except for the wage
being censored at the upper social security threshold. Typical panel data problems like
panel mortality or commemoration error do not arise. In addition, the data set is big
(about 8 millions observations) and (depending on the interpretation) representative
for all persons who have been employed at least once in a job that is part of the com-
pulsory notifying procedure in the observed 22 years (more than 80% of all workers -
the share is even higher among full–time employed workers). In the data set we can
observe three states: employed (E), recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment
benefits, unemployment assistance and income maintenance during participation in
training programs, BR) and out of sample (OOS).7 Unfortunately, none of the two last
categories corresponds exactly to the economic concept of unemployment. The second
state is likely to approximate unemployment better than the third one, since every per-
son being recipient of transfer payments is indeed unemployed from an administrative
point of view.8 On the other hand, there are persons who are registered unemployed
but who are not entitled to receive transfer payments. During this time, these people
are not recorded in the IABS. Thus, they cannot be distinguished from self-employed,
civil servants, people being out of labor force and others (see above) who are at least
once employed in a recorded job during the time period investigated.
We calculate transition rates between the three states, excluding observations in East
Germany and workers with parallel employment spells. These restrictions reduce our
sample by about 20% to 6.6 millions observations. Annual transition rates are based on
the labor market state on January 1st of each year.9 Transitions from employment to
receiving transfer payments are interpreted as transitions to unemployment,10 since the
benefit entitlement period is six months after an employment spell of six months, and
it increases to one year after a two year spell.11 In addition, the correlation between
7In addition, we could distinguish between people being out of sample between two spells of different
states and between people who are at one point in time not in the data set, but where there is no spell
either before or afterwards (broad definition). As an extreme case, the latter might include persons
who are dead, whereas the former does not. For most analyses, we use the narrow definition of the
third state, i.e. only out of sample spells where there are spells of different states both before and
afterwards. Although then, the state OOS is not representative any more, this narrow definition seems
more appropriate for our analysis.
8With the exception of participants in a training programme. We basically view them as being
unemployed since the goal of the programme is to improve the reemployment chances in the future.
9The yearly structure implies that our sample is a stock sample, which itself implies a length-biased
sampling problem when estimating transition rates. Both short employment and unemployment spells
are underrepresented in the data set.
10The largest group of workers not contained in the data set are civil servants who are typically
tenured (≡ no risk of unemployment).
11However, we have to note that at least for the US, it is known that most new jobs end early.
Farber (1999) finds that in the US about one third of all new full-time jobs end in the first six months,
while about two thirds end within the first two years.
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the administrative unemployment rate and the share of benefit recipients in our sample
is near one. In contrast, transitions from unemployment into employment are not that
easily approximated by transitions from receiving transfer payments to employment.
Long–term unemployed, whose benefits are exhausted, might find a job, and there
might be people shifting from the state receiving transfer payments to the state out of
sample by becoming a civil servant or by becoming self–employed. Therefore, in the
empirical section, we use different definitions of unemployment to check for consistency
of the results.
As wage information we use daily gross wages given in the data set, which are partly
censored at an upper social security threshold. Since the censoring threshold is not pre-
cise in the data, we observe wages which are slightly above the social security threshold
and a clustering of wage observations below this threshold. In addition, for data rea-
sons, there exists another category (wage 300) in the data which indicates censoring.
Where we need the wage information, we censor the wages slightly below the social
security threshold and replace the censored value by a conditional expectation from
a Tobit regression where we assumed that log-wages in every cross section (after con-
ditioning for demographic characteristics) are normally distributed.12 There is also a
lower bound in the wage distribution which stems from the fact that below a certain
salary threshold jobs are not subject to social insurance contribution (i.e. the wage
distribution is truncated from below). But there are wage notifications that are below
this threshold and therefore censored and set to 1 in the data set.13 About 1.5% of
the employment spells and 0.2% of the benefit recipient spells fall in this category.
We replace the censored value for part-time employees and apprentices by a condi-
tional expectation from Tobit regressions.14 Almost 75% of these censored spells are
apprentices, whom we typically exclude from our analysis of wage mobility. Part-time
employment, which accounts for further 7% of these censored values from below, are
also excluded from most analyses concerning wage mobility. For individuals who re-
ceive benefits, the wage variable contains their last wage, which we adjust with the
inflation rate (≡CPI). In more than 5% of the employment spells and in more than 6%
of the benefit recipient spells, the wages are not available because of data errors (wage
0). Where we need wages, we exclude these spells from our analysis. There is a second
missing category in the wages which is irrelevant for employees, but which we observe
in about 6% of the benefit recipient spells (wage 999). These are the spells which are
extrapolated backwards before the first employment spell of an individual that comes
from the compulsory notifying procedure. Again, we exclude these spells when we
12We censor slightly below the threshold because of the clustering around the threshold and since
we suspect that there is no real clustering around the social security threshold (see Fitzenberger and
Reize (2002)). In the case of clustering, Tobit estimates based on the rounded official daily threshold
yield unsatisfactory results, since the estimator tries to fit a fairly high density slightly below the
threshold.
13These notifications arise from the fact that there are both wage and working time criteria for a
job not to be subject to social insurance contribution.
14For other employees we suspect that the low wage notifications are incorrect and therefore we set
the censored wage values to missing.
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need wage observations. Finally, a last problem with the wage variable consists in a
structural break between 1983 and 1984. Before 1984, one-time wage payments and
non-monetary benefits were not systematically covered in the wage variable, whereas
from 1984 onwards they are. We use a time trend and/or year dummies to control for
this institutional change. When using wage dispersion measures, we calculate them
from cross sections of individuals on January 1st.
For the wage mobility analyses, we construct three skill groups from the education
information: The first category corresponds to persons who have neither a completed
vocational training nor a university degree (low-skilled). The second category con-
sists of people who have finished a vocational training but have no university degree
(medium-skilled). The third group corresponds to persons who have a university degree
or a degree from a technical college (high-skilled). Note that the education information
in the IABS is not always consistent across time so that we corrected the education
information based on the simple rule that a finished degree cannot be lost.
4 Empirical Results
First, we describe the stocks of individuals in different labor market states and tran-
sition rates over the business cycle and across different demographic groups that we
observe in the labor market. The second subsection deals with job–to–job transitions
and wage changes that follow such transitions. Finally, we characterize the wage dis-
tribution in more detail and examine determinants of wage mobility.
4.1 Stocks and Flows
There exists a large literature on worker and job flows in the labor market.15 The
literature mainly focuses on the forces behind and on the regularities of worker and
job flows, e.g. their cyclical behavior. In our data set, we are not able to calculate
job flows, as we cannot identify establishments, but we are able to identify worker
flows. Since we do not observe the population, however, but a 1% random sample,
transition rates are more meaningful than flows, which induces us to concentrate on
these. Starting with stock sizes, we observe on average about 218.000 individuals on
January 1st each year. About 12.500 of these are benefit recipients and 24.000 are out
of sample (see table 1). This corresponds to an average benefit recipiency rate of about
5.7% and to an average rate of 11% of individuals being out of sample. So about 83%
15For a comprehensive overview, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). A recent paper by Bachmann
(2005) analyzes the cyclical behavior of labor market transition rates in West Germany based on the
IABS. His results differ from our results. A major difference lies in the definition of the transition
rates. While we investigate transitions on a year-to-year basis (there is at most one transition per year),
Bachmann (2005) includes multiple transitions in the calculation of transition rates, i.e. individuals
with multiple transitions in a year have a higher implied rate.
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of the individuals we observe in each cross section are employed. One should recall
that the data are a random sample of employees, see previous section.
Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix show the development of the stocks over time. Figure 1
reveals that total employment increases over time until 1981, then decreases until 1985,
again increases until 1992, and finally decreases afterwards. Figure 2 raises doubt
whether the number of benefit recipients is always correct in the data set. The low
number of benefit recipients for 1975 can be explained by the fact that the data for
the first year are incomplete, while the number for 1979 seems to be incredible, both
for the number of benefit recipients and for the number of individuals that are out of
sample. Besides, we have no clear explanation why the number of individuals being
out of sample shows a hump-shaped trend over time. Possibly institutional reasons
(such as a prolongation of unemployment claims) are responsible for a higher share of
individuals that are registered as benefit recipients at the end of the 90s. The rate of
benefit recipients shows a stepwise increase, analogous to the widely discussed ratchet
effect for the trend in the unemployment rate (Franz (2003)). Employment growth and
the growth rate of the number of persons being out of sample are positively correlated
with the real GDP growth (correlation coefficients 0.42 and 0.25, respectively), whereas
the growth rate of benefit recipients is not related to real GDP growth (correlation
coefficient of 0.02).16 The rate of benefit recipients in our data set is strongly positively
related to the official unemployment rate (correlation coefficient of about 0.9) and
strongly negatively correlated with the inflation rate (Phillips curve).
Table 1 in the appendix shows that the service sector (business, household, and societal
services) is largest comprising around about 25% of all employees, followed by the
producer durable good sector covering about 20% of the employees.17 The smallest
sector is the agricultural sector (including energy, mining and gardening) with less
than 3% of the employees. The construction sector is the sector which has by far the
biggest rate of benefit recipients,18 while in the social security sector it is particularly
low (4.2%).19 The service sector has the highest rate of persons being out of sample
(16.1%), while basic industry has the smallest rate (5.6%). Concerning the development
of sectors over time, the decline of the construction sector starts in the early 80’s, but
unification leads to a temporary boom in this sector with increasing employment up
to 1995. For agriculture, the development is similar but there is no unification boom.
16The data for the business cycle are based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2000) and own calculations.
17When numbers for benefit recipients and out of sample are split according by sectors (other
job characteristics), the numbers refer to the sector (the job information) where individuals were
previously employed. Note that almost half of the unemployment spells terminate with a change of
sector. In the case of sectors one argument to take the former instead of the future sector is that there
are much more individuals where the last spell is an benefit recipient spell than there are individuals,
where the first spell is a benefit recipient spell.
18The benefit recipiency rate for the construction sector (main construction trade plus upgrading)
is about 9.3%. However, one should be careful with the interpretation of this result, since we use due
date information on the first January of each year. The high benefit recipiency rate in the construction
sector might be a seasonal phenomenon.
19The numbers refer to the sector information reported for the last job before unemployment.
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As expected from tertiarisation of jobs, employment in the service sector(s) increase(s)
over the whole 23 years (see figure 5). Employment in local authorities and the social
insurance sector is astonishingly constant over time, employing approximately the same
number of individuals in 1997 as in 1976 without much variation during this period
(see figure 6).
Regarding family status, we observe that on average about half of the employees in a
cross section are married (see table 1). Individuals who are not married have a higher
probability of being out of sample (13% versus 9%), while the share of benefit recipients
is almost identical. Splitting individuals according to their professional status yields
that by far the biggest group are clerks (almost 40%), whereas the smallest group are
foreman (about 2%). Apprentices account for about 7% of all employees. The highest
benefit recipiency rate is listed by unskilled workers (9.1%).20 The lowest benefit
recipiency rate can be found for foremen (3.5%), apprentices (3.1%)21 and part-time
workers who work less than half of the normal time (1%). Foremen also have the lowest
rate of persons being out of sample (4.1%), whereas almost one third of the part-time
working individuals, which work less than half of the normal time, are out of sample.
Regarding education, table 1 indicates for uncorrected education data (see page 8)
that by far the largest group (about 60%) are people that have no university-entrance
diploma (”Abitur”) but a vocational training degree (category 2, in table 1 in the
appendix), while about 27% have neither of these qualifications (category 1). The
remainder are persons with a university-entrance diploma or for whom educational
attainment is unknown. About 5% have either a technical college or university degree,
while less than 2% have attended a vocational training after the Abitur (category 4)
and even less do not have any further qualification (category 3). The benefit recipiency
rate is highest for individuals whose educational attainment is unknown and for persons
who do not have any degree (7%). The lowest rate is attained from technical college
(2.5%) and university graduates (about 2.8%). The highest rate of persons being
out of sample is listed by individuals that belong to category 3 (about 23.5%), while
the lowest rate is listed by individuals that possess a vocational training degree but no
university-entrance diploma (about 9%). The hypothesis of skill upgrading is confirmed
by the development of employment in different skill groups over time. Employment of
individuals with university-like education grows almost monotonically and more than
doubles between 1976 and 1997, while employment of individuals without vocational
training degree decreases by a third (see figure 7 in the appendix).
About 8% of the individuals in our data set are foreigners, who have a higher benefit
recipiency rate (7.2%) and a higher percentage of persons being out of sample (12%)
than Germans. Astonishingly, the number of foreigners strongly declines during the
80s and increases again in the 90s (see figure 8 in the appendix). About 60% of the
20The category unskilled is related to the position an individual holds in his current (if employed)
or previous (if benefit recipient) job, while low-skilled refers to an educational attainment.
21However, it might be that apprentices quitting their job or being dismissed have no unemployment
claims yet, which means that eventually their rate is underestimated.
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employed are men showing a slightly higher benefit recipiency rate than women and a
somewhat lower rate being out of sample. Looking at the development over time reveals
that, as expected, the participation of women has increased over time by about one
third between 1976 and 1996 (see figure 8 in the appendix). The benefit recipiency rate
for persons with children is higher while the rate of people being out of sample does not
differ a lot.22 Looking at age, we find that from 21-45 years the (5 year age) groups of
employed are almost of equal size, declining afterwards. In the age category from 61 to
62 years, there are not many individuals left and the group size is only about 5% of the
typical group size of other age groups. The rate of benefit recipients is relatively high
for persons aged between 21 and 30 and for elderly people between 51 and 60, while the
rate of people being out of sample is highest for individuals between 26 and 30 (maybe
women in pregnancy) and almost monotonically decreasing afterwards. Regarding the
development over time, several aspects can be seen. First, individuals enter the labor
market in the 90s much later than 20 years ago, with only half as many still entering
between 16 and 20. Second, the number of old employees increases strongly at the end
of the 90s. However, there is no clear cut trend of an ageing workforce. The number of
young individuals seems to be highest at the beginning of the 90s. Finally, regarding
wages, the benefit recipiency rate decreases as expected with the previous wage and so
does the rate of persons being out of sample.
Let us turn to the cyclical behavior of the transition rates. Figure 3 shows the per-
centage of individuals who changed their job during one year relating to all individuals
employed at the beginning of the year.23 There is a cyclical structure for job–to–job
transitions and the rate is positively related to real GDP growth (correlation coef-
ficient 0.45), whereas the correlation between the rate of persons who remain in the
same establishment with the business cycle is weaker (0.21).24 Allowing that last year’s
growth might influence today’s job changing rate shows that after one year the posi-
tive correlation is even stronger (0.51). Figure 4 reveals that the transition rate from
employment to benefit recipiency is countercyclical, as confirmed by the negative cor-
relation coefficient (-0.38).25 This negative correlation is even stronger if we allow for a
lag, i.e. the transition rate to benefit recipiency is correlated to the growth rate of the
previous year (-0.53). After two years the correlation becomes weaker. This negative
correlation is in accordance with the literature (see e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for
four European countries and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for the US). Transitions
22We doubt, however, that these numbers are correct, since there is a break in the data between
1989 and 1990. So the number of employees with children in 1991 is about one tenth of the number
in 1989.
23A potential shortcoming of our analysis of job–to–job transitions is, that we observe changes of
the establishment and not of the firm. Under the hypothesis that internal labor markets work more
or less similar to external labor markets, this is not a big shortcoming.
24In contrast to our results, Fallick and Fleischman (2001) conclude for the United States, that job–
to–job transitions are not procyclical. Our numbers and theirs, however, are not directly comparable,
since we relate the flows to the size of total employment, which might be responsible for the cyclical
behavior.
25Excluding (in part unrealistic) values from the 70s even leads to a correlation coefficient of -0.76.
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from benefit recipiency to employment are practically not related to GDP growth. The
lagged transition rate, though, is strongly positively related with GDP growth (0.54),
but after two years the correlation has vanished. The correlation with the outflow rate
from benefit recipiency is weakly positive (0.18).26 It seems that layoffs and/or quits
with a subsequent benefit recipiency spell are countercyclical in contrast to hirings
being procyclical (all transitions to employment). The outflow rate from employment
is countercyclical as indicated by a correlation coefficient of -0.2, thus the probability
to remain employed is procyclical (see table 4 in the appendix). The fact that we
have the countercyclical structure for job separations is in accordance with the view
that a downturn might have a cleansing effect in the sense that unproductive jobs are
destroyed. It has to be noted, however, that job–to–job transitions are a means of
improving match quality, which does not happen in a downturn, but in an upturn.
Now, we turn to the differences across demographic groups.27 Table 3 in the appendix
shows the labor market transition rates across all demographic groups. We observe
three states and four transitions for each of the three states, since there is one state
that indicates that an individual has left the data set and that he does not return
any more. In addition, we observe one additional rate for the group of the employed,
namely the transition rate from job to job.
Table 2 shows that on average about 8% of the previously employed change jobs,
while about 3% become benefit recipients, and further 3% move out of sample. A bit
more than 3% leave the data set (e.g. because of retirement, death, or business start–
ups), while on average a bit more than 80% stay with the same employer or experience
recalls. Hence with only about 20% of all workers leaving their current job per year, the
German labor market exhibits higher employment stability than the US labor market
where this number is about 37%. Between one and two percent of the about 88% who
remain employed in two consecutive years have an intervening benefit recipiency spell
and another one to two percent have an intervening spell out of sample (not in the
table). Once individuals are benefit recipients, they are employed again in the next
year at a rate of 25%. Similarly, about 25% return to employment when they are out
of sample. About 40% of the benefit recipients are benefit recipients in the next year,
while about 15% change to the state out of sample and another 15% leave the data
set. Individuals that are out of sample remain in more than 65% of the cases in this
state in the following year, while about 10% either become benefit recipients (probably
with an intervening employment spell) or leave the data set (with an intervening spell
of either employment or benefit recipiency).
Search theory argues that individuals draw i.i.d. wage offers from some wage offer
26Here, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) conclude for the outflows
from unemployment that they are countercyclical. Again, the differences to our results might come
from the fact that we normalize by the number of unemployed, which might be responsible for the
weakly procyclical behavior in our data set.
27Note that the (weighted) mean of the transition rates for those demographic characteristics which
can change over time is not necessarily equal to the transition rate over all individuals, since we include
in our analysis only individuals that maintain the same characteristics in two consecutive years.
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distribution at a constant rate. If individuals earn higher wages, wage offers exceed
their earned wage more rarely, i.e. the job changing rate decreases with wage. Looking
at table 3, where we separate the wage distribution into three crude wage categories
of equal interval size (low, middle, and high wages), clearly confirms this argument.
The risk of becoming benefit recipient or changing to the state out of sample shows
similar patterns and declines with age. Likewise, the frequency at which individuals
stay with the same employer increases with the wage. The transition rate from benefit
recipiency to employment and probability of remaining benefit recipient is highest for
intermediate wages. The transition rate to employment is higher for low wages than
for high wages. While individuals with low wages comparatively often change to the
out of sample state, high-wage individuals often leave the data set completely. The
transition rates from out of sample to other states do not differ much.
Table 3 shows pronounced differences across age groups. Economic theory predicts
that older individuals are on average in a better position in the wage distribution so
that they accept wage offers from competitors more rarely. Therefore, we expect that
the job changing rate declines with age. This is confirmed by the data.28 Suitably, the
frequency with which individuals stay with the same employer increases from age 20 to
age 50 and declines afterwards. The benefit recipiency risk is high for young individuals
up to 30 years and for elderly people from 56 onwards. The risk of moving out of sample
is highest for individuals aged 21 to 25 and decreases afterwards, while obviously the
probability of leaving the data set is very high for people aged 56 and older. The
transition rate from benefit recipiency to employment is highest for individuals between
21 and 25 and decreases monotonically with age afterwards. The frequency at which
individuals remain unemployed in two consecutive years increases from 47% for the 21
to 25 age group to 58% for the 51 to 55 age group and then decreases rapidly. The
transition probability to the state out of sample is high until age 35 and decreases
afterwards, while the probability of leaving the data set starts to increase from age 36
onwards. The outflow rate from the state out of sample decreases continuously with age,
while the probability to remain out of sample decreases from age 20 onwards. The inflow
rate into benefit recipiency increases monotonically up to age 60 and the probability
to leave the data set is particularly high for the elderly. Since unemployment–to–job
transitions are rarer for older individuals, search frictions seem to be higher for this
group, while the job destruction rate declines at least up to age 50 indicating less
frictions. In Fitzenberger and Garloff (2005), we distinguish transition rates for prime-
age working male by age and education. There are pronounced differences across
age and education groups which are mostly in accordance with the search theoretic
framework.
In the literature, education is an important determinant of economic outcomes. How-
28Farber (1999) presents the fact that the job–to–job transition rate declines with tenure. This is
consistent with our observation on the behavior of this rate with age if older persons have on average
longer tenures, which is always true if the job offer rate for unemployed is higher than the job offer
rate on the job plus the job destruction rate.
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ever, simple equilibrium search theory does not make clear predictions on the effect
of education on transition rates. From table 3 we see that the job changing rate in-
creases with educational attainment. While medium-skilled individuals are more likely
to stay with the same employer, high-skilled individuals are more likely to change jobs.
Clearly the benefit recipiency risk and the risk of becoming out of sample is highest
for low-skilled individuals and decreases with educational attainment. High-skilled in-
dividuals are most probable to vanish from the data set, eventually because they are
more likely to become self-employed.29 Once a benefit recipient, the job finding rate
increases with education as well, although university graduates seem to have a some-
what lower rate than the medium-skilled. Individuals without any degree have by far
the highest probability to remain unemployed in two consecutive years. If individuals
are out of sample, their transition rate to employment increases with education, while
the transition rate to benefit recipiency and the probability to remain out of sample
decrease with education. Summing up, as expected, the situation is more favorable for
the high-skilled, which means, in terms of search theory, that there are less frictions
for the highly educated.
Regarding gender differences, women stay more rarely with the same employer over
two consecutive years, while all other transition rates are a bit higher (see table 3).
If women are benefit recipients, they remain less often in this state than men (34%
versus 48%), since they show more frequent transitions to out of sample and to leaving
the data set. Once women are out of sample, they remain so more often than men do
(69% versus 60%) with all other rates being lower. Germans seem to be better off in
the labor market exhibiting a higher probability to change jobs as well as to remain in
the same job and lower probabilities to move to benefit recipiency, out of sample, or
to leave the data set. For benefit recipients the differences are not large, but Germans
are more likely to return to employment. In the state out of sample, foreigners have
a slightly higher probability to become employed or benefit recipient and to leave the
data set. At the same time, they show a lower probability to remain out of sample.
Since we suspect that marital status is subject to measurement error, we do not discuss
differences here.
Evidence regarding the professional status shows that especially clerks often change
jobs. This might be due to scale effects of markets, since clerks are the biggest group
and since therefore it might be easier to get in contact with a new job. In contrast,
foremen are the least mobile group and they stay most often with the same employer.
Unskilled workers have the highest benefit recipiency risk, while again foremen have
the lowest risk. Apprentices and part-time employed most often change to the state
out of sample. Part-time employed also leave the data set fairly often. The highest
transition rate from benefit recipiency to employment is found for clerks. Again, this
29Another explanation might be that high-skilled married couples can afford that only one person
works, since they obtain higher wages. Hence, if high-skilled individuals are often married to other
high-skilled individuals, after marriage they vanish more often from the data set.
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might be due to scale effects.30 Unskilled workers and craftsmen are most likely to
remain unemployed in two consecutive years, while clerks have the lowest probability.
Foremen show the highest propensity to leave the data set and most frequently return
from the state out of sample to employment, while they remain rarely in this state in
two consecutive years.
In the service sector job–to–job transitions are most frequent, but they are also frequent
in commerce and traffic. Again, this might be due to scale effects. Basic industry has by
far the lowest job–to–job transition rate and the highest rate to stay in the current job.
In durable goods production and social insurances, the stayer rate in the current job
is also high, while it is low in the construction sector and in the service sector. Benefit
recipiency risk is high in the construction and in the consumer goods sector. In the
service sector as well as in the construction sector and commerce, people often switch to
the state out of sample. Farmers and employees in the social insurance or traffic sector
often leave the data set completely. Once being benefit recipient, former employees in
the construction or service sector are most likely to find a new job in this sector within
the next year. Farmers and employees in the social insurance sector are most likely
to remain benefit recipients, while this likelihood is lowest for the commercial sector.
Benefit recipients from the service sector are most likely to change to the state out of
sample, while benefit recipients from the consumption goods sector, the durable goods
and basic goods sectors often leave the data set completely. Transition rates from out
of sample to employment do not vary much, whereas the transition rates from out of
sample to benefit recipiency state are high for the farming and construction sectors
and low for services and the commercial sector.
Concluding, we find clear differences in almost all characteristics that we have looked at.
Some differences can be explained in terms of economic theory, whereas others cannot.
It is important to take account of these differences. Differences across characteristics
indicate differences in the degree of frictions, which can explain differences in economic
outcomes.
4.2 Wage Changes following Job-to-Job Transitions
This section explores the effect of job–to–job transitions on wages. This is important
for several reasons and there exists a large body of literature on the effect of seniority
on wages (see e.g. Dustmann and Meghir (2005)).31 It is often argued that due to ac-
cumulation of specific human capital wages increase with tenure.32 A contrary position
argues that tenure effects are the result of shifts in the composition of employment.
High-wage jobs are more likely to survive, so that we observe that long tenures and
30Petrongolo and Pissarides (2002) find in their analysis for the UK that scale effects are reflected
in higher wages and not in more matches, since the reservation wage of the individuals reacts on a
higher job-offer rate.
31Recognize that seniority can be interpreted as a sequence of non–mobility decisions.
32This argumentation can be traced back to Becker (1964).
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high wages are correlated. Third, from the search theoretic perspective, with grow-
ing experience, individuals have received on average more job offers from competing
firms, which might lead as well to job–to–job changes under wage gains (see Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) for a theoretical model) or to higher wages in the specific firm
if firms can counter wage offers from competing firms (see Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a)).33 So the fact that we observe less job–to–job transitions and higher wages as
people age might stem from the fact that they have acquired a lot of specific human
capital which they would loose when changing jobs or from the fact that they simply
have higher wages because of more offers from competing firms, so that on average
job offers rarely exceed their wage. Recognize that, from this perspective, job–to–job
transitions are the central source of wage growth and that they play a critical role in
equilibrium search models. Almost all of the existing equilibrium search models that
derive an endogenous wage distribution depend critically upon the fact that workers
can search on the job.34
Both the effect of seniority on wages and effects of mobility on wages have been dis-
cussed intensively in the literature. The literature on mobility, though, is often mo-
tivated from a more geographical perspective. Regarding the interaction of mobility,
human capital, and wages the literature is more narrow. Examples for studies ad-
dressing this problem in a non-structural way are Antel (1986), Light and McGarry
(1998) and Garloff and Kuckulenz (2005). In the following, we analyze in detail the
wage changes associated with a direct job–to–job transition, defined as a transition
from one establishment to another within 15 days. Recall that the average annual
job-changing rate lies just below 8%. This might not exactly reflect the job–to–job
changes we define here, since there might be individuals who change jobs and return
to the previous employer afterwards (recalls) or individuals who change jobs and then
become benefit recipients or move out of sample afterwards. Furthermore, there might
be individuals who change jobs more than once within one year. We suspect, however,
that the difference between the two definitions is not big. Moreover, as demonstrated
above, these rates range from a minimum of less than 1% a year (for the age group
61-62 years) up to a maximum of just under 15% (for the age group 21-25 years).
Overall, we observe about 360,000 direct job–to–job transitions over the 23 years and
the development over time closely resembles its normalized measure in figure 3. On
average, about 64% of the individuals gain from a job–to–job change, while about 29%
experience wage cuts.35 Average gains for the 65% that have wage increases are quite
high with an average gain of 41% relative to their previous wage. The average loss of
the individuals suffering a wage cut is about 18%. For all individuals this implies an
average gain of 21% associated with a job–to–job transition. However, one has to be
33In addition, there might be a match-specific component that does not result from higher produc-
tivity but from better information about the match (see e.g. Moscarini (2003)).
34For an exception, see e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) where the decision problem is not sequen-
tial, and Teulings and Gautier (2004).
35This number is roughly comparable to the numbers that are found by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2004) using the ECHP.
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careful when interpreting these numbers, since all types of transitions are included in
the calculations. So, for example, we have included transitions from apprentices to their
regular profession or people changing from part-time to full-time employment and vice
versa. As a result, we probably overestimate both gains and losses.36 We use different
wage definitions to check for consistency (see appendix A.5). Since the differences are
not big, we use in the following the first wage definition (wage A) where wages are
deflated and where we replace censored wages by their conditional expectations from
Tobit–estimates.
In table 6, we distinguish job–to–job transitions for the group of full-time employed,
according to the working time in the subsequent job. The bulk of transitions is within
the group of full-time employees. The results are broadly consistent with the wage
change being a crucial determinant of the decision to change a job, as purported by
search theory. In general, individuals gain considerably from job–to–job transitions.
But, even within the category of full-time employees, there remains a significant pro-
portion of job changers with wage cuts. This is difficult to reconcile with standard
search theory, although more advanced theoretical models are able to explain this (see
Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2004) or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b)).37 Prob-
ably, most job–to–job transitions from full-time to part-time are not motivated by the
desire to improve upon the wage but by other reasons (as e.g. the birth of a child).
Among these transitions, the share of winners shrinks to 45% (respectively, to 25% for
individuals who change to half or less than half of regular time), while the share of
losers increases to 53% (71%). It is quite remarkable that the relative gains of those
who win increases to about 50% (48%). So does the relative loss of losers. It remains
an open question as to why the winners who work less gain on average considerably
more.38 Changing to part-time with more than half of the regular time results on
average in a small wage gain (+7.7%), while individuals who change to half or less
than half of regular time lose on average 22%. As a final caveat, one should not over-
interpret these results because full-time/part-time variable is likely to be subject to
measurement error. There is nothing, we can do about this in our study.
Table 7 shows the differences across movers within categories. If we omit apprentices
from the analysis of transitions within the group of full-time employees, the share of
winners is a bit lower and the share of losers is a bit higher than for all full-time
36We repeated the procedure using the CPI to deflate wages, but the results were so similar that
we do not report them here.
37In the first model, they introduce a new sort of shocks, so called reallocation shocks, which force
individuals to change jobs irrespective of the wage offer they get. The basic idea in the second model
is that people change jobs since they have better career opportunities in the new establishment, which
makes them accept wage losses. In the literature, the empirical findings for the share of individuals
who accept wage losses are quite different. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) find a very small number
for the Netherlands (about 11%; OSA-panel) which they interpret as measurement error, while Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002b) find a much larger number (between 36% and 55%, DADS-panel) for France.
38However, a part of these high-wage gains is explained by the fact that we have included apprentices
in the analysis. Furthermore, some of this high-paying part-time jobs are very transitory in the sense
that they only last some days.
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employed individuals. Still, the share of winners is somewhat below two thirds and
the share of losers under 30%, while about 7% do not experience a wage change when
changing jobs (probably in many cases censored values). Excluding apprentices, the
average relative gain of the winners decreases clearly from about 40% (table 6) to
about 25%. So does the average relative loss of the losers which decreases from around
17% (table 6) to around 15%. The overall gain amounts to just under 13%. Among
part-timers, who work less than half of the regular time, there are fewer winners,
while in the group of more than half part-time employed average gains and losses are
comparatively small. As to be expected, changing to full-time employment is associated
with the highest average wage changes.
Next, we separate job–to–job changes by terciles (see table 8 in the appendix) of the
conditional distribution of the initial wages (on age, education and year) for full-time
employed West-German individuals without multiple employment spells. As predicted
by search theory, the share of winners is highest (+75%) in the low wage tercile, similar
to +68% in the middle wage tercile and much lower in the upper wage tercile (+44%).
However, adding the share of individuals without a wage change shows that differences
might be smaller, because in the upper tercile, where censoring is a severe problem,
about 22% do not experience a wage change, while in the other terciles this amounts
only to around 3%.39 The share of losers increases with the wage tercile. The average
gain of the winners is - as expected - the highest in the low wage tercile (around 40%),
while it is around 17% for the two higher wage terciles. The average loss of the losers is
much higher for employees from the upper tercile compared to the two lower terciles.40
Overall, the evidence is in accordance with search theory.
Across age categories, the share of winners declines from about 71% for the age group
16-20 (excluding apprentices) to about 53% for the oldest age group. For the share
of losers there is no such clear-cut development. With about 30%, the share of losers
is highest for the age categories 20 and 35 and again for the oldest age group, while
between age 35 and 60 it decreases. Relative gains are quite high for the youngest age
group and then decline with age from about 50% to 16.5%. The same holds for the
losses, but they do not vary as much as the relative gains (from 18% for the youngest
to 13% for the oldest). Controlling for the position in the wage distribution partly
eliminates this effect. It disappears for the high and the middle tercile, while it is still
present for the low-wage tercile (results are omitted here).
Next, we summarize differences through regressions focussing on prime-age (25-54
years) working males. Table 10 shows how the share of winners and losers varies
39Job changes for individuals whose wages are censored before will very often result in a censored
wage observation afterwards indicating no wage change, see section 3 for the imputation of wages in
the case of censoring.
40If job–to–job changes under wage cuts are interpreted as reallocation shocks, as in Jolivet, Postel-
Vinay, and Robin (2004), then the higher wage loss for higher wage categories is the wage ladder
effect, since after being reallocated, individuals obtain offers from the same wage offer distribution
which means that the loss for high-wage individuals is higher.
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by age and education. The share of winners increases with educational attainment and
age.41 The share of losers is lower, the higher the educational attainment, while there
is no clear age effect. But the share of losers is on average lower for older individuals
than for younger individuals. While the relative gain of winners is negatively related
with the share of winners, this is not the case for the share of losers. From this, we
conclude that age seems to have a significant impact on the motivation for a job–to–
job change decision, with wage gains losing importance as individuals age. Table 11
summarizes the relationship between the relative gain of the winners and the relative
loss of the losers, by age and education. We find that high-skilled individuals have
significantly higher gains and lower losses than low-skilled; maybe because voluntary
job–to–job changes in this category are more frequent. The medium-skilled do not
differ significantly from the low-skilled. The relative gain of the winners decreases with
age, which is in accordance with search theory, but there is no age effect on the relative
loss. The latter indicates that job–to–job changes under wage losses are not driven by
economic reasons. An exogenous job loss and a new random offer from the wage offer
distribution would imply that the relative loss increases with age. The share of winners
is again negatively correlated with the relative gain of the winners, while the share of
losers is positively related to the relative loss of the losers.
Now, we include the tercile position in the conditional wage distribution in the re-
gressions (tables 13 and 14). The position in the wage distribution has the expected
effect on the shares and the relative gain/loss and seems to reduce considerably the
effect of education and age. Indeed, based on search theory, age should not show an
independent effect on the share of winners. But, we find that controlling for the wage
position changes the signs for the mostly significant age dummies and there is no clear
cut trend across age groups. The average age effect is positive for the share of winners
and not different from zero for the share of losers. For the relative gain, as expected,
we find that it is lower for individuals in higher wage categories and that it increases
with educational attainment. As before, age has on average a negative effect on the
relative gain and a positive effect on the relative loss.
Furthermore, we examine wage changes after an intervening benefit recipiency spell
and categorize their duration into five intervals (table 9 in the appendix). First, most
unemployment spells are very short, i.e. shorter than 3 months, or very long, i.e. longer
than a year. The share of winners as compared to their last wage decreases with benefit
duration. While it is about 55% of the short-term unemployed, only 40% of the long-
term unemployed have a higher wage. Accordingly, the share of losers increases with
benefit duration. Surprisingly, however, the relative gain of winners rises with benefit
recipiency duration and so does the relative loss of losers. Regarding the relative gain
of winners, longer search duration seems to improve the match quality, which again is
in accordance with predictions from search theory. While the average change after a
job–to–job transition for all individuals decreases with benefit duration, this is not the
41Note that the share of winners is likely to be too low for the upper tercile, see footnote 39.
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case for the long-term unemployed. Here, the longer search period leads to a higher
average wage in the job after the benefit phase.
Finally, we investigate the wage changes for individuals who changed jobs (within
15 days) and compare their wage growth in the following four years with individuals
without a job–to–job transition in the first year (table 12 in the appendix). The results
are not clear cut. From 1975 to 1983, the wage growth for changers is remarkably higher
than for stayers in the first year and the difference decreases over time. Two years after
the job change, there is no difference. After 1983, however, job changers are not in a
better position anymore. In some years it even seems that job changers are in a worse
position than job stayers, possibly reflecting compositional effects.
Summing up, wages seem indeed to play a crucial role for job–to–job changes, in accor-
dance with search theory. On average, almost all changes involve remarkable average
wage gains. Notwithstanding non-monetary motives, job–to–job changes appear to
advance one’s career through higher wages. However, a significant proportion of job–
to–job changes are associated with wage losses. While layoffs associated with finding a
new job immediately might account for part of these wage losses, it is unlikely that such
a high share of wage losses can be attributed to this effect alone or to measurement
error (as in Van den Berg and Ridder (1998)). Here, an investment motive anticipat-
ing later career opportunities as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) or in Burdett and
Coles (2003) seems more appealing. Furthermore, there are pronounced differences be-
tween different demographic groups (which we do not discuss here), that are not easily
explained by economic theory, and there are differences for full-time and part-time
employed. Thus, noneconomic factors are likely to influence the decision to change a
job. In accordance with search theory, the frequency and the size of wage gains are
highest for workers in the lower part of the wage distribution conditional upon age,
education, and year.
4.3 Wage Structure and Changes in the Relative Wage Posi-
tion
This section analyzes the wage distribution for different groups and the determinants of
changes in the relative wage position.42 First, figure 9 and 11 show the distribution of
(log-) wages in a cross section of individuals on 1 January 1986 for all full-time employed
individuals (excluding apprentices, 9) and for clerks only ( 11). For comparison reasons,
figures 10 and 12 display the distribution of log-wages for clerks in 1976 and 1996. The
distribution of log-wages does not appear (censored) normal because of the thin left
tail. Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests confirm this: for each partition of the sample, we reject
the hypothesis that log-wages are normally distributed. Furthermore, considering the
distribution of wages in (homogeneous) age-education cells, search theory suggests that
wages should be skewed to the left, which is also rejected by a visual inspection.
42For an extensive treatment of wage changes, see Pfeiffer (2003).
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Here, the analysis is restricted to employees who are employed in two successive years.
Our interest is on career advancements and its determinants, especially job–to–job
transitions. We take this group of individuals, define their position in the wage distri-
bution in the first year (measured in deciles) and observe which decile position they
hold in the next year, depending on their characteristics. For each group of individuals,
a 10x10-Matrix captures the transitions in the decile position. Then, we aggregate this
information in an ordered Probit model allowing for the three outcomes upward, no
change, or downward mobility in the decile position. As before, censored wages are re-
placed by their conditional expectation. If an individual’s wage is censored, we observe
the individual in the decile of the wage distribution where we observe censoring for
the first time coming from below, i.e. when the sixth decile is the first censored decile
(that is, more than 40% of the wages are censored, which is often the case for the high-
skilled group aged 31-33), all individuals are observed in this decile. If an individual’s
wages are censored in two consecutive years, we will observe no wage change if the first
censored decile is the same in the two consecutive years (the most plausible case). In
the case where the first censored decile is lower (higher) than in the previous year, say
the fifth, we interpret this as wage cuts (increases) for all censored individuals.
We start with the ordered Probit model in table 15 based on those individuals who
are employed in two consecutive years. The dependent variable is 1 if an individual
moves up by one or more deciles of the wage distribution, it is 0 if the individual stays
in the same decile, and it is -1 if the individual moves down by one or more deciles.
For this analysis, we include only prime-age males in the age group 25 to 54 years,
disaggregated in three year age intervals. Among others, the set of covariates in table
15 includes the interquartile range in wages, the rate of job changes, and the stayer rate
in employment by age-education cell, as well as a dummy for a job–to–job transition
at the individual level (different employers in the two consecutive years).
The age-education cell with the lowest age and the lowest education level and the
year 1975 is chosen as omitted category. The probability of climbing the wage ladder
decreases significantly in age and increases in the skill level. This result is in accor-
dance with search theory. The dummy variable for job–to–job transition is also highly
significant and positive, thus job–to–job transitions involve upward wage mobility as
predicted by search theory.43 The impact of the cell specific variables, the wage dis-
persion measure (iqr), the transition rate from job–to–job, and the retention rate in
employment is difficult to predict. It seems plausible that a higher wage dispersion
is favorable for upward wage mobility, since the return to search is higher. However,
our results show that the effect of the wage dispersion measure is small and the point
estimate is negative. Search theory also offers an alternative interpretation. If wage
dispersion is high, then search frictions are large and we observe little (upward) wage
mobility. This effect should work through a low job–to–job transition rate, which we
43Of course, the job change indicator is endogenous. However, from a search-theoretic perspective,
it is irrelevant whether the job change takes place because the individual obtains a higher wage offer
or whether the individual obtains a higher wage because he changes the job.
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account for in the analysis, and through the job destruction rate. The job–to–job tran-
sition rate is not significant, thus rejecting this argument. However, the retention rate
in employment (≡(1-job destruction rate)) has a small but significantly positive effect
on upward wage mobility. With a decreasing probability to remain employed, individ-
uals might be more willing to accept wage cuts which is in line with the argument.
Table 16 shows a similar analysis replacing the year dummies with a linear time trend
and allowing for interactions between job–to–job changes and age. The effects of age
group and education category are similar in magnitude, although now the middle-
education group shows the highest propensity to have wage increases. The job change
dummy effect is now somewhat larger, and we can see from the table that job–to–job
changes have a smaller effect on the probability of having wage increases as individuals
age. This is in accordance with search theory, since older individuals have on average a
better position in the wage distribution, and therefore their propensity for upward wage
mobility through job–to–job transition decreases. As argued before, it might be that
a bigger share of job–to–job transitions are not economically motivated as individuals
age.
Separate analyses for the different education groups and for job changers and stayers,
the results do not differ much (see tables 17 and 18). However, for high-skilled workers
we find that the effect of age on upward wage mobility is first positive and then negative,
which can be due to university graduates entering the labor market later. Furthermore,
the effect of age on the propensity for upward wage mobility shows a similar pattern
for all education groups and for changers and stayers. It becomes stronger with higher
education. For example, in the group of stayers, the coefficients for age range from
-0.13 (28 to 30 years) to -0.29 (52 to 54 years) for the low-skilled and from +0.98 (28 to
30 years) to -1.58 (52 to 54 years) for the high-skilled. Interestingly, the effect of wage
dispersion is positive for changers and stayers in the two lower education groups, while
it is negative for the high-skilled, however, the latter results might be questionable
because of censoring. The result for the high-skilled dominates the positive effects in
the other wage groups when pooling the three education groups. For the stayer rate in
employment, a similar pattern is found. While the coefficient for changers and stayers is
negative for the two lower education categories, it is positive for the high-skilled. Again,
the effect of the high-education category dominates the effect of the lower education
groups. The effect of the job–to–job transition rate is insignificant for the two lower
education groups, whereas it is significant and negative for the high-education group.
This is a surprising result, since we would have suspected that a higher job changing
rate corresponds to less frictions and faster upwards movements, thus favoring upward
wage mobility.
Finally, we classify the group of individuals with transitions from unemployment to
employment by the positions of their wage in the contemporaneous wage distribution
before and after unemployment (see table 19). Based on these data, we perform the
same analysis as before. The age profile shows a similar pattern as before for low-skilled
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and medium-skilled individuals. For the high-skilled, no such pattern is found and no
coefficient is significant. The wage dispersion measure and the transition rate from
employment to benefit recipiency are not significant in either model.
Summarizing our findings, job–to–job transitions are strongly related to wages. We find
that age shows a strong negative effect on upward wage mobility. Elderly individuals
are less likely to experience wage gains. The same holds for older individuals changing
jobs: they gain less than their younger counterparts. This is in accordance with job
search theory. Furthermore, education has a strong positive effect on upward wage
mobility. A possible explanation could be that the informational situation is better
for the high-skilled. Cell specific macro variables apparently do not have the same
effect on the three education groups with different effects for the high-skilled. The
partial correlation of the stayer rate in employment and the upwards wage mobility is
positive for the low-skilled and the medium-skilled, for the high-skilled this correlation
is negative. Similar results are observed for other macro variables.
5 Conclusions
Using equilibrium search theory as the theoretical background, this paper presents a
descriptive empirical analysis exploring labor market dynamics and the wage structure
in Germany. We find considerable differences in labor market transition rates over
the business cycle and across demographic groups, which can partly be explained by
search theory. Our analysis also explores the wage structure and determinants of wage
changes. Wage changes following job–to–job transitions are quite remarkable and most
job changes involve wage gains. There exists a considerable number of individuals
who do not gain from job–to–job changes, which is unlikely to be explained solely by
the fact that some individuals may be laid off and immediately find a new job, or by
measurement error. This finding somehow contradicts the simple equilibrium search
model, as outlined in the theoretical section.
Further findings are that, first, part-time employees gain less from job–to–job changes
than full-time employees, which we cannot explain easily by economic theory. Second,
job–to–job changes in the low-wage group often involve wage losses. We show that
wages are neither log-normally distributed for either group we looked at, nor that the
wages for a homogeneous age-education group are skewed to the left. This can be taken
as prima facie evidence against equilibrium search theory, implying a wage distribution
skewed to the right. Regarding upward wage mobility, age (negative) and job–to–job
transitions (positive), as well as the interaction between the two (decreasing with age)
show the expected relationship. Also, education effects appear to be in accordance
with theoretical considerations. The effect of cell specific macro variables appear to
vary across the education groups. High-skilled workers differ somewhat from the other
groups.
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Clearly, the non-structural approach taken here does not suffice to evaluate a complex
set of theories. Nevertheless, our comprehensive descriptive analysis provides some
clear insights. One of the crucial aspects of equilibrium search theory, i.e. job–to–job
transitions, shows a close relationship with wages and the wage distribution, mostly
in accordance with theoretical considerations. Further research should evaluate the
empirical content of equilibrium search theory for Germany in a more structural way.
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A Appendix
A.1 Abbreviations
1. Labor market states:
(E) employed
(BR) recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment benefits, unemployment
assistance and income maintenance during participation in training programs)
(OOS) out of sample
2. E–EO is the share of individuals who change jobs between two consecutive years.
3. E–E is the share of individuals who are employed in the first year and still (or
again) employed in the second year.
4. U–E is the share of individuals who are unemployed in the first year and employed
in the second year.
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A.2 Average stocks and transitions rates across demographic
groups
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Figure 1: Number of employed individuals
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Benefit Recipients Out of Sample
Figure 2: Total number of benefit recipients and individuals that are temporarily not
in the data set
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Figure 3: Job-to-job transitions as percentage of employment
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Figure 4: Transition rate from employment to benefit recipiency
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Table 1: Stocks across different characteristics
Characteristic Employed Benefit Out of Benefit Out of Total
recipient sample recipient sample
rate rate
All 181486 12354 23782 0.057 0.109 217622
Sectors
Main construction trade 8233 1077 1008 0.104 0.098 10318
Construction (upgrading) 4978 460 587 0.076 0.097 6025
Farming, energy, mining 5664 378 524 0.058 0.080 6566
Services (business) 16405 1588 3173 0.075 0.150 21166
Services (household) 7237 802 2108 0.079 0.208 10148
Services (society) 22403 1078 4284 0.039 0.154 27765
Food/stimulants industry 6115 410 815 0.056 0.111 7340
Basic goods production 14392 989 907 0.061 0.056 16288
Commerce 25481 1653 3995 0.053 0.128 31129
Producer durable good prod. 36198 1882 2578 0.046 0.063 40659
Social Security/local auth. 11996 577 1206 0.042 0.088 13778
Consumer goods 14016 974 1312 0.060 0.080 16302
Traffic/telecommunication 8222 448 1243 0.045 0.125 9913
Missing 144 37 42 0.167 0.190 224
Marital status
Single 81578 5739 13182 0.057 0.131 100499
Married 94102 6573 10252 0.059 0.092 110928
Missing 5805 42 348 0.007 0.056 6195
Professional status
Apprentices 12927 466 1429 0.031 0.096 14823
Clerks 69483 2869 7290 0.036 0.092 79642
Skilled Workers/Craftsmen 39337 2808 2988 0.062 0.066 45133
Unskilled Workers 37985 4406 5977 0.091 0.124 48368
Masters/Foremen 3414 131 152 0.035 0.041 3697
Home Workers 332 32 87 0.071 0.192 451
Part-Time Workers(a) 3085 49 1565 0.010 0.333
Part-Time Workers(b) 14881 845 4186 0.042 0.210
Missing 42 748 107 0.833 0.120 897
Education
Category 1(c) 48792 4039 6066 0.069 0.103 58897
Category 2(d) 107614 5771 10989 0.046 0.088 124375
Category 3(e) 1835 79 592 0.031 0.236 2506
Category 4(f) 3295 122 652 0.030 0.160 4068
Polytechnic 4115 123 757 0.025 0.152 4995
University 50059 183 1432 0.028 0.216 6620
Unknown 10619 1286 3176 0.085 0.211 15081
Missing 211 751 117 0.696 0.109 1079
Nationality
Foreigner 15009 1342 2235 0.072 0.120 18585
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Characteristic Employed Benefit Out of Benefit Out of Total
recipient sample recipient sample
rate rate
German 166249 10391 24132 0.052 0.108 198072
Missing 228 621 116 0.644 0.120 965
Sex
Female 74477 4868 13064 0.053 0.141 9240
Male 107009 7486 10718 0.060 0.086 125213
Children
0 children 144666 6877 20456 0.040 0.119 171998
1 child 15308 2968 1525 0.150 0.077 19801
2 children 10973 0 421 0.000 0.037 11394
3 children 3235 0 129 0.000 0.038 3364
4 children 886 0 39 0.000 0.042 925
5 children 298 0 15 0.000 0.047 313
6 children 103 0 7 0.000 0.061 110
7 children 36 0 2 0.000 0.048 37
> 7 children 375 0 8 0.000 0.021 383
Missing 5607 2509 1182 0.270 0.127 9298
Wages(h)
0-50 31390 2045 16506 0.041 0.331 49941
51-100 63992 5173 21942 0.057 0.241 91107
101-150 49653 2310 9244 0.038 0.151 61207
151-200 20712 690 1812 0.030 0.078 23241
201-250 7527 248 619 0.030 0.074 8394
251-299 2057 38 51 0.018 0.024 2146
300 (i) 694 92 1600 0.039 0.671 2386
Missing 19 724 81 0.879 0.098 824
Age
< 16 years (j) 5974 376 799 0.053 0.112 7149
16-20 years 12379 562 843 0.041 0.061 13784
21-25 years 21501 1830 3907 0.067 0.143 27238
26-30 years 22316 1752 4885 0.061 0.169 28952
31-35 years 21101 1408 4190 0.053 0.157 26699
36-40 years 21276 1151 3339 0.045 0.130 25765
41-45 years 20745 1066 2331 0.044 0.097 24142
46-50 years 18906 1033 1432 0.048 0.067 21371
51-55 years 16275 1184 896 0.064 0.049 18355
56-60 years 10315 1597 560 0.128 0.045 12472
61-62 years 756 125 49 0.134 0.053 930
> 62 years (k) 9944 271 551 0.025 0.671 10766
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Characteristic Employed Benefit Out of Benefit Out of Total
recipient sample recipient sample
rate rate
(a)Working less than half of normal time
(b)Working more than half of normal time
(c)No vocational training degree, High School Diploma
(d)Vocational training degree, no High School Diploma
(e)No vocational training degree, High School Diploma
(f)Vocational training degree, High School Diploma
(h)In DM per day
(i)Top coding category for part of the employees
(j)...when entering the labor market
(k)...when leaving the labor market
Table 2: Transition rates for all employees (in %)
E-OE E-SE E-BR E-OOS E-LS
7.85 82.55 2.92 3.19 3.49
BR-E BR-BR BR-OOS BR-LS
25.87 42.62 15.13 16.38
OOS-E OOS-BR OOS-OOS OOS-LS
24.68 6.57 65.02 3.72
E: employed, OE: other employer than in the previous year,
SE: same employer as in previous year, BR: benefit recipient,
OOS: out of sample, LS: last spell (vanishes from the data set)
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Table 3: Transition rates across demographic groups
(in %) E-OE E-SE E-BR E-OOS E-LS BR-E BR-BR BR-OOS BR-LS OOS-E OOS-BR OOS-OOS OOS-LS
All employees 7.85 82.55 2.92 3.19 3.49 25.87 42.62 15.13 16.38 24.68 6.57 65.02 3.72
men 7.58 83.68 2.72 2.77 3.26 26.45 48.18 11.8 13.57 26.8 8.72 60.44 4.05
woman 8.24 80.9 3.23 3.8 3.82 25.16 34.53 19.88 20.44 22.87 4.76 68.91 3.46
Germans 7.83 82.97 2.83 3.13 3.24 25.73 41.97 15.22 17.07 24.49 6.37 65.9 3.25
foreigners 7.47 78.31 3.88 4.2 6.14 23.31 42.42 15.61 18.66 26.68 7.48 58.63 7.22
married 4.92 82.87 2.4 6.27 3.53 18.11 39.34 19.93 22.62 29.15 5.79 62.85 2.2
single 9 74.86 2.73 10.03 3.38 26.56 47.56 16.59 9.29 24.59 3.11 70.62 1.68
low skilled 4.70 82.09 3.62 5.35 4.24 13.16 48.89 17.61 20.34 21.07 6.02 70.10 2.81
medium skilled 6.70 84.24 2.48 3.62 2.97 23.31 39.78 18.66 18.24 25.02 5.27 67.47 2.23
high skilled 7 83.37 1.69 3.01 4.93 22.97 37.37 16.75 22.9 27.59 3.85 65.72 2.84
low wage 7.48 72.20 4.16 11.86 4.30 16.34 42.53 24.82 16.32 19.83 3.86 74.19 2.12
mid wage 6.93 76.19 3.49 10.69 2.70 22.03 44.97 18.56 14.44 30.10 4.14 64.31 1.45
high wage 4.24 81.26 1.50 10.75 2.25 14.30 43.19 18.82 23.70 42.23 2.45 54.34 0.98
A16-20 11.94 76.5 4.63 3.92 3.01 24.33 46.99 10.26 18.42 44.6 10.57 37.61 7.22
A21-25 14.24 71.5 5.17 5.49 3.6 32.06 42.67 12.3 12.96 38.91 13.66 41.53 5.9
A26-30 10.17 78.45 4.38 3.21 3.79 29.4 43.9 10.9 15.8 36.38 15.76 40.07 7.79
A31-35 8.32 82.71 3.37 2.28 3.31 27.91 46.82 11.04 14.22 36.71 16.32 39.9 7.07
A36-40 6.99 86.25 2.67 1.59 2.49 25.57 51.44 9.82 13.18 36.36 17.94 37.59 8.11
A41-45 5.95 88.19 2.44 1.25 2.17 23.11 53.31 8.86 14.72 34.77 20 36.16 9.07
A46-50 4.97 89.11 2.42 1.13 2.37 18.46 56.74 7.71 17.09 31.62 24.33 31.75 12.3
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(in %) E-OE E-SE E-BR E-OOS E-LS BR-E BR-BR BR-OOS BR-LS OOS-E OOS-BR OOS-OOS OOS-LS
A51-55 3.97 88.44 2.99 1.04 3.57 11.91 58.18 5.28 24.63 26.93 29.51 26.89 16.68
A56-60 2.66 76.75 6.25 1.42 12.92 3.56 43.96 2.24 50.24 14.46 39.61 17.4 28.53
A61-62 0.89 28.42 11.73 1.15 57.82 0.08 17.18 0.04 82.7 0 26.95 0 73.05
apprentices 5.79 81.2 3.1 7.19 2.71 12.33 44.73 23.14 19.8 26.67 4.19 67.59 1.56
clerks 7.18 84.22 2.13 3.23 3.23 22.08 37.6 18.18 22.14 24.33 4.22 69.4 2.05
craftsmen 5.53 84.38 3.03 4.16 2.89 18.78 49.67 15.58 15.97 25.53 7.05 65.24 2.18
simple workers 5.03 81.58 4.28 4.76 4.35 15.12 50.29 16.42 18.18 20.8 7.68 68.06 3.46
foremen 3.23 88.57 1.93 2.47 3.8 10.09 43.34 8.78 37.79 29.94 5.96 61.07 3.03
part-time 3.69 83.26 2.58 5.17 5.29 11.68 35.06 22.67 30.59 20.47 2.74 74.18 2.61
construction 5.61 82.14 4.6 4.35 3.3 21.04 53.12 14.83 11.01 20.9 9.83 66.41 2.86
farming; energy 3.54 86.98 2.26 2.73 4.5 13.8 56.43 12.47 17.3 21.26 9.99 64.47 4.29
services 6.89 81.65 2.65 4.7 4.12 18.06 44.89 22.01 15.04 19.54 4.43 73.42 2.61
food and stimulants 3.77 85.88 2.97 3.72 3.67 10 47.18 17.08 25.74 19.71 6.63 70.51 3.15
basic industry 1.95 90.27 2.83 2.06 2.89 8.63 54.98 9.44 26.95 20.55 8.86 67.56 3.04
commerce 6.2 82.73 3.16 4.41 3.5 15.24 42.31 19.55 22.89 19.43 4.59 73.75 2.23
durable goods 3.13 89.08 2.43 2.79 2.58 11.61 45.72 14.77 27.9 21.95 6.56 69.23 2.26
social insurance and 3.15 88.82 1.67 1.97 4.39 10.5 56.83 15.53 17.14 19.98 7.41 69 3.61
local authorities
consumption goods 3.35 86.75 3.51 2.89 3.5 12.24 44.52 14.72 28.53 20.81 7.83 68.28 3.09
traffic; telecommunication 6.56 83.59 2.05 3.4 4.39 14.65 50.12 18.69 16.54 20.94 6.18 69.58 3.3
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A.3 Development of stocks over time
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Figure 5: Development of employment in agriculture and construction
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Figure 6: Development of employment in social insurance and services
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Figure 7: Total number of low-skilled and high-skilled employees over time
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Figure 8: Total number of employed women and foreigners (individuals without Ger-
man nationality) over time
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Table 4: Correlation of real GDP growth with transition rates
Correlation between . . . and real GDP growth Standard deviation
transition rate from . . . (correlation coefficient)
job to other job 0.450 0.200
job to other job (t+1) 0.508 0.198
job to same job 0.205 0.219
job to BR -0.381 0.207
job to BR (t+1) -0.527 0.195
BR to employment 0.135 0.227
BR to employment (t+1) 0.542 0.193
BR to other states 0.177 0.226
job to not same job -0.205 0.219
BR: Benefit recipiency state as defined in the data section.
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A.4 Wage distributions for different groups and years
Log-wage distribution for:
Figure 9: full-time employed individuals
(including apprentices) in 1986
Figure 10: clerks in 1976
Figure 11: clerks in 1986 Figure 12: clerks in 1996
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A.5 Results from direct job–to–job changes for different wage
definitions
For the first wage definition (A) we performed separate Tobit-regressions for the cen-
soring above and below. For full-time employees (excluding apprentices, home workers
and the missing category) we used Tobit-regressions to predict the conditional expec-
tation for (deflated) wages that were censored from above within the group of full-time
employed for each year. Other censored values were omitted from our analysis. We
performed Tobit-regressions for part-time employees and apprentices to predict values
that were censored from below and replaced the censored values with their conditional
expectations. For the second definition (B) we did the same, but we used data from
the official statistics for the mean of the wage distribution to predict conditional expec-
tations. For the third definition (C) we replaced all censored values by the censoring
thresholds. Finally, for the fourth definition (D) we excluded all censored values from
the analysis.
Table 5: Wage changes after job–to–job transitions for different wage definitions
Observations Share winners Share losers No change
Wage A 274255 65.59 27.20 7.21
Wage B 274255 65.59 27.20 7.21
Wage C 274965 66.30 28.64 5.05
Wage D 252865 68.31 28.66 3.03
Relative gain of Relative loss of Average wage
the winners (in %) the losers (in %) change (in %)
Wage A 26.60 -15.13 13.33
Wage B 26.64 -15.15 13.35
Wage C 25.39 -13.92 12.85
Wage D 24.88 -14.28 12.90
There are some more observations in the C variable since, for wage C, we do not omit full-time
employed individuals, whose wage is censored from below. No change means that the wage is exactly
the same before and after the job–to–job transition. Wage A: Tobit estimates for upper and lower
bound. Wage B: Tobit estimates, based on the annual income data of the official statistics. Wage
C: Censored values are replaced by their censoring threshold. Wage D: Censored values are excluded
from our analysis.
As one can see in table 5, results do not differ by much. The maximum difference
in the share of winners is less than 1 percentage point, while in the share of losers it
is a bit more than 1 percentage point. The average gain differs by a maximum of 4
percentage points, while average losses differ by less than 2 percentage points.
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Table 7: Transitions within categories
Total Share winners Share losers No change
Full-time 2 to full-time 2 274255 0.656 0.272 0.072
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 13375 0.643 0.291 0.066
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 2217 0.549 0.289 0.162
Relative gain Relative loss Overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
Full-time 2 to full-time 2 0.266 -0.151 0.133
Part-time 1 to part-time 1 0.205 -0.143 0.09
Part-time 2 to part-time 2 0.268 -0.162 0.101
Full-time 2: Within the group of full-time employed, excluding apprentices.
Part-time 1: Working hours are more than 50% of regular working hours.
Part-time 2: Working hours are less than or equal to 50% of regular working hours.
Table 8: Transitions within wage categories
Total Share winners Share losers No change
Tercile 1 101461 0.753 0.214 0.033
Tercile 2 70786 0.681 0.293 0.025
Tercile 3 61514 0.473 0.342 0.22
Relative gain Relative loss Overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
Tercile 1 0.391 -0.156 0.247
Tercile 2 0.176 -0.155 0.063
Tercile 3 0.172 -0.215 -0.012
Table 6: Transitions full-time to...
Observations Share Share No change
winners losers
Full-time 322636 0.646 0.281 0.073
Part-time (>50% regular time) 7820 0.444 0.532 0.025
Part-time (≤50% regular time) 1055 0.245 0.709 0.045
Relative gain Relative loss Overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
Full-time 0.396 -0.173 0.207
Part-time (>50% regular time) 0.504 -0.275 0.077
Part-time (≤50% regular time) 0.476 -0.478 -0.222
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Table 9: Transitions within unemployed categories
Total Share winners Share losers No change
Unemployed > 3 months 48381 0.525 0.439 0.036
Unemployed > 3 ≤ 6 months 30251 0.509 0.448 0.043
Unemployed > 6 ≤ 9 months 13440 0.474 0.501 0.025
Unemployed > 9 ≤ 12 months 10815 0.449 0.532 0.019
Unemployed > 12 months 43146 0.462 0.524 0.015
Relative gain Relative loss Overall
of the winners of the losers wage change
Unemployed > 3 months 0.277 -0.179 0.103
Unemployed > 3 ≤ 6 months 0.278 -0.196 0.096
Unemployed > 6 ≤ 9 months 0.392 -0.232 0.095
Unemployed > 9 ≤ 12 months 0.459 -0.268 0.083
Unemployed > 12 months 0.533 -0.29 0.109
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Table 10: Share of winners and losers after job–to–job transitions by category
Variable Winners Losers
Vocational training degree -0.031∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
University/technical college -0.179∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
28-30 years -0.025 -0.013
(0.016) (0.011)
31-33 years -0.079∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.016) (0.011)
34-36 years -0.117∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011)
37-39 years -0.155∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011)
40-42 years -0.141∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011)
43-45 years -0.168∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.011)
46-48 years -0.154∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012)
49-51 years -0.156∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012)
52-54 years -0.177∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012)
Time 0.1E-02 0.1E-02∗∗∗
(0.1E-02) (0)
Relative gain/loss -0.197∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.055) (0.037)
Intercept -0.781 -2.506∗∗∗
(1.103) (0.747)
N 687 687
R2 0.518 0.607
χ2(13) 723.66 1037.57
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 11: Relative gain or loss after job–to–job transitions by category
Variable Winners Losers
Vocational training degree -0.004 0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
University/technical college 0.025∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.008) (0.007)
28-30 years -0.025∗∗ -0.003
(0.011) (0.009)
31-33 years -0.04∗∗∗ 0
(0.012) (0.009)
34-36 years -0.049∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.012) (0.009)
37-39 years -0.088∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.012) (0.009)
40-42 years -0.092∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.012) (0.009)
43-45 years -0.085∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.012) (0.009)
46-48 years -0.108∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.012) (0.009)
49-51 years -0.118∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.012) (0.009)
52-54 years -0.121∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.012) (0.009)
Time -0.1E-02 0.2E-02∗∗∗
(0) (0)
Share of winners/losers -0.095∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.032)
Intercept 1.366∗ -3.235∗∗∗
(0.764) (0.591)
N 687 665
R2 0.286 0.135
χ2(13) 275.18 103.79
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 12: Wage growth for job changers and stayers
1975 1976 1977 1978
stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers
year 0.046 0.183 0.059 0.231 0.051 0.127 0.048 0.096
year+1 0.055 0.066 0.046 0.056 0.043 0.039 0.033 0.031
year+2 0.041 0.043 0.035 0.037 0.024 0.030 0.002 -0.001
year+3 0.033 0.033 0.019 0.027 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
year+4 0.015 0.025 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 0.004 0.012
1979 1980 1981 1982
stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers
year 0.040 0.081 0.017 0.057 0.022 0.037 0.036 0.047
year+1 0.013 0.007 0.019 0.005 0.031 0.024 0.062 0.043
year+2 0.006 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.048 0.042 0.033 0.027
year+3 0.007 0.014 0.037 0.037 0.022 0.024 0.047 0.046
year+4 0.034 0.035 0.021 0.022 0.046 0.047 0.031 0.034
1983 1984 1985 1986
stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers
year 0.065 0.066 0.051 0.054 0.083 0.070 0.071 0.067
year+1 0.046 0.028 0.078 0.051 0.066 0.044 0.058 0.039
year+2 0.062 0.047 0.048 0.039 0.045 0.030 0.024 0.016
year+3 0.034 0.035 0.029 0.028 0.010 0.008 0.036 0.037
year+4 0.027 0.026 0.009 0.010 0.032 0.035 0.027 0.032
1987 1988 1989 1990
stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers stayers changers
year 0.062 0.073 0.051 0.051 0.086 0.077 0.077 0.070
year+1 0.046 0.019 0.074 0.044 0.069 0.037 0.042 0.024
year+2 0.051 0.040 0.048 0.033 0.039 0.022 0.036 0.014
year+3 0.029 0.030 0.024 0.018 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.008
year+4 0.018 0.017 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.029 0.028
1991 1992
stayers changers stayers changers
year 0.049 0.060 0.042 0.049
year+1 0.039 0.017 0.036 0.015
year+2 0.027 0.012 0.058 0.031
year+3 0.037 0.029 0.012 0.010
year+4 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.002
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Table 13: Share of winners and losers after job–to–job transitions by category, control-
ling for the position in the wage distribution
Variable Winners Losers
Tercile 2 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Tercile 3 -0.274∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Medium-skilled 0.010 -0.059∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
High-skilled 0.069∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
28-30 years 0.071∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
31-33 years 0.069∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
34-36 years 0.036∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
37-39 years 0.034∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
40-42 years 0.055∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
43-45 years 0.081∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017)
46-48 years 0.088∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017)
49-51 years 0.118∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
52-54 years 0.234∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023)
Relative gain/loss 0.117∗∗∗ -0.023
(0.021) (0.050)
Intercept 0.628∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020)
N 1575 1575
R2 0.664 0.652
χ2(14) 3112.5 2950.862
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table 14: Relative gain or loss after job–to–job transitions by category, controlling for
the position in the wage distribution
Variable Winners Losers
Tercile 2 -0.207∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.004)
Tercile 3 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004)
Medium-skilled 0.007 0.015∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004)
High-skilled 0.102∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.010) (0.005)
28-30 years -0.183∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007)
31-33 years -0.210∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007)
34-36 years -0.213∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007)
37-39 years -0.218∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.007)
40-42 years -0.231∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.007)
43-45 years -0.236∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.007)
46-48 years -0.260∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.008)
49-51 years -0.287∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.008)
52-54 years -0.303∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010)
sharerwinners/losers 0.153∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.027) (0.013)
Intercept 0.457∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.008)
N 1741 1608
R2 0.436 0.474
χ2(14) 134.879 1449.034
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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A.6 Decile Transitions
Table 15: Decile transitions
Variable Coefficient (Std. err.)
28-30 years -0.131∗∗∗ (0.042)
31-33 years -0.199∗∗∗ (0.046)
34-36 years -0.255∗∗∗ (0.049)
37-39 years -0.299∗∗∗ (0.053)
40-42 years -0.377∗∗∗ (0.057)
43-45 years -0.406∗∗∗ (0.058)
46-48 years -0.437∗∗∗ (0.061)
49-51 years -0.459∗∗∗ (0.065)
52-54 years -0.506∗∗∗ (0.072)
1976 -0.153∗∗∗ (0.058)
1977 -0.163∗∗∗ (0.053)
1978 -0.151∗∗∗ (0.051)
1979 -0.17∗∗∗ (0.064)
1980 -0.225∗∗∗ (0.053)
1981 -0.182∗∗ (0.075)
1982 -0.152∗∗∗ (0.044)
1983 -0.253∗∗∗ (0.080)
1984 -0.144∗∗∗ (0.053)
1985 -0.078 (0.063)
1986 -0.164∗∗ (0.069)
1987 -0.034 (0.061)
1988 -0.102 (0.062)
1989 -0.116∗ (0.069)
1990 -0.226∗∗∗ (0.083)
1991 -0.047 (0.094)
1992 -0.053 (0.067)
1993 -0.082 (0.090)
1994 -0.054 (0.074)
1995 -0.041 (0.083)
1996 -0.113 (0.083)
Medium-skilled 0.242∗∗∗ (0.041)
High-skilled 0.273∗∗∗ (0.044)
Job change dummy 0.285∗∗∗ (0.008)
Interquantile Range -9.34E-04 (1.23E-03)
E-E 5.37E-05∗∗ (2.26E-05)
E-OE 3.99E-05 (2.2E-04)
cut1 -1.301∗∗∗ (0.084)
cut2 0.267∗∗∗ (0.083)
N 991041
Log-likelihood -965191.237
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Variable Coefficient (Std. err.)
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see appendix.
Table 16: Decile transitions
Variable Coefficient (Std. err.)
28-30 years -0.149∗∗∗ (0.036)
31-33 years -0.215∗∗∗ (0.039)
34-36 years -0.266∗∗∗ (0.039)
37-39 years -0.308∗∗∗ (0.039)
40-42 years -0.388∗∗∗ (0.041)
43-45 years -0.421∗∗∗ (0.044)
46-48 years -0.453∗∗∗ (0.049)
49-51 years -0.479∗∗∗ (0.057)
52-54 years -0.524∗∗∗ (0.054)
Time 0.004 (0.003)
Medium-skilled 0.276∗∗∗ (0.048)
High-skilled 0.254∗∗∗ (0.038)
Job change dummy 0.339∗∗∗ (0.010)
Job change x 28-30 years 0 (0.027)
Job change x 31-33 years -0.033∗∗ (0.016)
Job change x 34-36 years -0.051∗∗∗ (0.011)
Job change x 37-39 years -0.082∗∗∗ (0.014)
Job change x 40-42 years -0.134∗∗∗ (0.012)
Job change x 43-45 years -0.101∗∗∗ (0.019)
Job change x 46-48 years -0.125∗∗∗ (0.015)
Job change x 49-51 years -0.114∗∗∗ (0.015)
Job change x 52-54 years -0.128∗∗∗ (0.020)
Interquantile range/1000 -0.419 (1.127)
E-E/10000 -0.743∗∗∗ (0.154)
cut1 6.856 (5.552)
cut2 8.420 (5.554)
N 991041
Log-likelihood -966348.106
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Standard Errors are robust with respect to correlations within age-
education cells. Abbreviations, see appendix.
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Table 17: Decile transitions for changers
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.002 -0.180∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.019) (0.167)
31-33 years -0.028 -0.277∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗
(0.083) (0.025) (0.143)
34-36 years -0.075 -0.339∗∗∗ -0.082
(0.086) (0.027) (0.111)
37-39 years -0.066 -0.418∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.031) (0.082)
40-42 years -0.208∗ -0.531∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.034) (0.095)
43-45 years -0.129 -0.550∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.035) (0.110)
46-48 years -0.162 -0.615∗∗∗ -1.066∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.036) (0.123)
49-51 years -0.219 -0.635∗∗∗ -1.282∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.038) (0.155)
52-54 years -0.175 -0.662∗∗∗ -1.389∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.039) (0.169)
Interquantile range 0.005 0.002∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.003)
E-OE 0.002 0.000 -0.006
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005)
E-E 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
cut1 -0.411∗∗ -1.101∗∗∗ -2.116∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.107) (0.189)
cut2 0.432∗∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.083) (0.081)
N 6587 59500 9821
Log-likelihood -6945.001 -61892.24 -9074.522
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Table 18: Decile transitions for stayers
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.134∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.027) (0.341)
31-33 years -0.169∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ 0.632∗
(0.012) (0.035) (0.335)
34-36 years -0.191∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ 0.141
(0.011) (0.040) (0.257)
37-39 years -0.180∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.257
(0.012) (0.045) (0.182)
40-42 years -0.216∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.637∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.050) (0.150)
43-45 years -0.272∗∗∗ -0.616∗∗∗ -0.971∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.052) (0.142)
46-48 years -0.275∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -1.184∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.055) (0.175)
49-51 years -0.285∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -1.470∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.059) (0.228)
52-54 years -0.289∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.060) (0.270)
Interquantile range 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
E-OE 0.000 0.000 -0.011∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
E-E 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
cut1 -0.699∗∗∗ -1.587∗∗∗ -3.070∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.090) (0.315)
cut2 0.682∗∗∗ 0.064 -1.058∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.070) (0.228)
N 129368 698954 86811
Log-likelihood -133156.035 -666708.572 -70199.603
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Table 19: Decile transitions for unemployed
Variable Education Education Education
category 1 category 2 category 3
28-30 years -0.007 -0.195∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.028) (0.018) (0.026)
31-33 years -0.165∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.030) (0.056)
34-36 years -0.088 -0.430∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.061) (0.038) (0.069)
37-39 years -0.282∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.045) (0.046) (0.064)
40-42 years -0.235∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.043) (0.049) (0.039)
43-45 years -0.334∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.052) (0.051) (0.022)
46-48 years -0.394∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗ -0.051∗
(0.038) (0.055) (0.029)
49-51 years -0.373∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.035) (0.057) (0.025)
52-54 years -0.487∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.043) (0.058) (0.023)
Interquantile range 0.008 0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.016) (0.001) (0.001)
U-E 0.002 0.000 0.017
(0.005) (0.000) (0.010)
cut1 -0.542∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.107) (0.044)
cut2 0.381 0.053 0.568∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.044) (0.042)
N 1704 10989 1039
Log-likelihood -1827.02 -11617.305 -1108.274
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